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Abstract
We study the eﬀect of borrowing limits on welfare in several ver-
sions of exchange and production economies. There is a “quantity”
eﬀect of a larger borrowing limit which is beneﬁcial for liquidity con-
strained agents, but essentially irrelevant otherwise. There is also a
“price eﬀect” which tends to increase the interest rate so that lenders
are better oﬀ and borrowers are worse oﬀ. The combination of these
eﬀects produces that aggregate welfare in equilibrium (or ex ante wel-
fare) displays an inverted U-shape as a function of the borrowing limit.
In inﬁnite horizon economies with incomplete markets we ﬁnd a siz-
able “middle class” of not liquidity constrained but indebted agents
that observes small gains, or even loses, after the borrowing limit is
enlarged.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study the eﬀects on welfare of institutionally ﬁxed borrow-
ing limits. The usual economic intuition based on eﬃciency considerations
would unambiguously advocate for loosening tight borrowing constraints,
since they may prevent achieving fully eﬃcient allocations by limiting the
amount of inter temporal trade. The interest in this research comes from
the fact that, contrary to this view, we show in a variety of environments
that too large borrowing limits may have perverse eﬀects on welfare.
The intuition for the results is as follows. We decompose the eﬀect of changes
in the borrowing limit into a “quantity eﬀect” and a “price eﬀect”. In
particular, an increase in the borrowing limit has a positive quantity eﬀect
whenever it eﬀectively alleviates the borrowing constraint, but it is negligible
when the constraint does not bind. Hence, the strength of the quantity eﬀect
on the welfare of a particular agent depends on how much stringent is the
borrowing constraint given her assets and other sources of income. The
price eﬀect is due to the fact that in general-equilibrium prices adjust to
clear the markets. If a larger volume of debt is the result of allowing more
borrowing, then we would expect a larger return to saving in order to clear
the assets market. Therefore the usual price eﬀect after an increase in the
borrowing limit is positive for savers but negative for borrowers. It follows
that the eﬀects of increasing the borrowing limit may be very diﬀerent across
individuals, depending not only on the limit itself but also on their income
and wealth levels.
In section 2 we formalize these ideas in a two-period model of exchange
with an exogenous distribution of borrowers and lenders. The only poten-
tial friction embedded in this environment is a borrowing limit. We show
that lenders always gain with the increase in the borrowing limit, and yet,
borrowers may loose if the initial borrowing limit is suﬃciently large. Fur-
thermore, the welfare loses of the borrowers would be even larger if the bor-
rowing limit is increased up to the level it is not binding anymore. In terms
of the intuition stated above, a large borrowing limit reduces the quantity
eﬀect and makes relatively stronger the price eﬀect, which sooner or latter
dominates the eﬀect on the welfare of borrowers. We conclude that in this
simple environment the welfare of borrowers displays an inverted U-shape
as a function of the borrowing limit. Interestingly, a too large borrowing
limit may be undesirable from the point of view of the borrowers, and yet,
should it be implemented it would be exhausted. We also aggregate welfare
by means of a utilitarian social welfare function and show that this measure
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of welfare may decrease after the borrowing limit is increased. Therefore,
in the ex ante welfare sense all agents may gain by ﬁxing a binding borrow-
ing limit rather than a too loose one. This result is formally proved under
mild assumptions, thus an implication of this analysis is that the optimal
borrowing limit is, in fact, a binding constraint.
In section 3 we extend the previous analysis by studding similar issues but
using quantitative methods in multi period economies in which the distribu-
tion of agents is endogenously determined. Speciﬁcally, we explore exchange
and production economies characterized by incomplete insurance against id-
iosyncratic shocks (as in Huggett 1993, 1997, Aiyagari 1994, and Krusell and
Smith 1998, among many others). In this analysis the measure of welfare we
use is the amount of consumption required to leave each agent indiﬀerent
between before and after the borrowing limit has increased. Furthermore,
we compute measures of consumption equivalent units to compare steady
states and also taking into account the transition between them.
We ﬁnd that a larger borrowing limit tends to beneﬁt agents that were liq-
uidity constrained in the initial equilibrium. These agents gain because of
the positive quantity eﬀect. We also ﬁnd that rich households, for whom the
borrowing limit is essentially irrelevant, also beneﬁt from the higher return
on their saving observed after the increase in the borrowing limit.1 Hence
these agents gain because of the positive price eﬀect we mentioned before.
Finally, we also ﬁnd a sizable fraction of poor agents that are not liquidity
constrained (and thus do not beneﬁt especially from having access to larger
credit) that tend to suﬀer because they hold debt (which is more costly
after the increase in the interest rate). The ﬁnal eﬀect on the welfare of
these agents and on the size of this category, which we informally label as
“middle class”, depends on the speciﬁcs of each example. For instance, in an
exchange economy the middle class may represent above 85% of the popula-
tion, and they may observe an average loss of 3% of consumption (once the
transition is properly taken into account). In our version of the production
economy calibrated to the U.S. economy the middle class represents over
40% of the population, and the losses in consumption rang between 0.01%
-when we increase the borrowing limit from roughly a 27% of per capita
assets up to a 57%- and 3% of consumption when the borrowing limit is
further increased up to 73% of per capita assets.
Our paper is closely related to Japelli and Pagano (1999), where similar
1This kind of general equilibrium eﬀect is similar to that explored in Conesa and
Krueger (1999), showing that removing social security may, in fact, beneﬁt poor workers
that mainly have labor income and hold a low level of assets.
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results are obtained relying on the ﬁnite lives of agents and on the dynamic
eﬃciency of the economy when technological progress is endogenous. Also,
Chaterjee et al. (2002), Mateos-Planas and Seccia (2006), Livshits et al.
(2007), and A´braha´m and Ca´rceles-Poveda (2007) study the endogenous
determination of borrowing constraints and their interaction with partici-
pation constraints in economies with incomplete insurance markets against
idiosyncratic shocks. We contribute to this literature by showing that nega-
tive welfare eﬀects may be an intrinsic feature of too large borrowing limits.2
Our results are also related to a diﬀerent strand of the literature which takes
the borrowing limit as given and studies the consequences for welfare of al-
lowing some form of bankruptcy at the household level. This is in principle
an important diﬀerence with respect to our approach, since in our model
default is not an option and thus agents honor their debts irrespectively
of their wealth and idiosyncratic endowment. To be more precise, Athreya
(2002) ﬁnds that in an exchange economy eliminating the bankruptcy op-
tion would promote such a reduction in deadweight losses that it would
outweigh the welfare looses due to less favorable consumption smoothing
opportunities. In view of this, our results for exchange economies extend
those in Athreya (2002) by showing that a welfare loss would be material-
ized by ﬁxing a too large borrowing limit even if no default is allowed and
non-pecuniary costs are absent from the analysis. Related to this, Li and
Sarte (2006) study similar issues in a production economy and they ﬁnd
that welfare would decrease with the elimination of bankruptcy. The reason
why welfare is larger with the default option is that in their model there
is over accumulation of capital with respect to the level one would observe
if bankruptcy was impossible. That is, in their model default increases the
risk premium in a intermediation sector, which reduces the amount of debt
and increases the stock of capital. Under the usual assumptions on the tech-
nology for production more capital makes labor more productive, and thus,
the economy ends up with larger production and consumption.3 Contrary
2The literature about the various eﬀects stemming from borrowing constraints is large.
See, among others, Zeldes 1989, Deaton 1991, Attanasio and Weber 1995, Chamberlain
and Wilson 2000, Carroll 1994, 2000 (for eﬀects on consumption), Bencivenga and Smith
1991, Marcet and Marimon 1992, Banerjee and Newman 1993, Ljungqvist 1993, Japelli
and Pagano 1994 (for related eﬀects on growth and development), Mookherjee and Ray
2002 (dynamics of inequality), Paxson 1990, Lucas 1994, Alvarez and Jermann 2000, 2001,
Haliassos and Hassapis 2001 (for implications for assets prices and portfolio choice), and
Pratap and Rendon 2003 (about ﬁrm’s investment).
3This may seem paradoxical because it suggests that there are welfare gains associated
to the introduction of a policy that takes the competitive allocation further away from
the ﬁrst best allocation (the competitive allocation with incomplete markets is already
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to these results, in our production economy we obtain that the losses steam
from too little capital when the borrowing limit is enlarged.4 This is due to
the fact that in our model default is not an option, and thus, no (costly)
intermediation is needed.
Finally, there is a connection between our work and the work of Davila et
al. (2005). These authors study the notion of constrained eﬃciency for
incomplete markets economies and conclude that in general, there is no rea-
son to expect that the equilibrium allocation is the same one a hypothetical
benevolent planner facing the same constraints and competitive price set-
ting would have chosen. For instance, using a model economy calibrated
to mimic key observations of the U.S. economy, these authors ﬁnd that the
constrained-eﬃcient amount of capital is about 14.7 units, whereas the com-
petitive amount is about 4 units. When we do steady state comparisons of
welfare under several borrowing limits for the same economy, we ﬁnd that
the optimal lower bound for asset holdings is positive (hence no borrowing
is allowed). Speciﬁcally, the positive optimal lower bound implies an aver-
age assets holdings of about 6.3 units of capital. This ﬁnding is interesting
from a policy perspective, because it suggests that simple policy instruments
like a lower bound on assets will not be able to implement the constrained
eﬃcient allocation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the two-
period model and states a few results at a formal level, section 3 considers
the inﬁnite horizon economies and reports the results from numerical simu-
lations, and section 4 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 A simple model of consumption smoothing
To develop the intuition for the results in its simplest form, we consider
an exchange economy in which a continuum (mass one) of agents live for
two periods. The endowments of the consumption good in each period
can be either “high” or “low”, with 0 < elt < e
h
t for t = 1, 2, and we let
πt ∈ (0, 1) be the probability of receiving the high endowment in period
characterized by a larger amount of capital than in the ﬁrst best (Huggett 1993, Aiyagari
1994)). Nevertheless, Hart (1975), Grossman (1977), and more recently Gimenez (2003),
can be seen as examples of the fact that alleviating a constraint in incomplete market
economies does not necessarily result in larger welfare.
4In this regard, our results are more in line with those in A´braha´m and Ca´rceles-Poveda
(2007).
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t = 1, 2. Agents can smooth out their consumption over time by trading a
safe asset. We think of this asset as a riskless bond. Speciﬁcally, a positive
amount of this asset in the end of the ﬁrst period indicates that the agent is
a saver, and each unit of assets is a sure claim to 1+R units of consumption
goods in the second period. Borrowing is indicated by a negative amount
of assets, and it is allowed up to an exogenous limit −B. We preclude
the possibility of default, hence debt issues in the ﬁrst period convey the
unavoidable obligation of delivering the 1 + R units of consumption goods
in the second period per unit of debt. Finally, we assume that all consumers
have the same instantaneous preferences over consumption goods, which are
represented with a twice diﬀerentiable function u(c) satisfying:
A1: u is C2 on R++, and it is strictly increasing and strictly concave, with
limc→0 u′(c)→ +∞ and limc→+∞ u′(c) = 0.
A. The deterministic case
We begin by specializing the previous setting to obtain a deterministic en-
vironment. To this end, let e¯ = π2eh2 + (1− π2)el2, normalize π1 = 1/2, and
assume that agents start trading once the endowment in the ﬁrst period is
known.5 Given initial endowments and the return R, the problem of a given
(type of) agent reduces to choosing how much to save or dissave in assets.
Formally, the utility maximization problem as a function of B for i = l, h is
given by:
maxai vi(B) = u(ci1) + βu(c
i
2)
s. to ci1 + a
i = ei1,
ci2 = e¯ + (1 + R)a
i,
ci1,2 ≥ 0, ai ≥ −B,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount rate of future utility. The solution of the
previous problem is characterized by the usual ﬁrst order conditions:
u′(ci1) = β(1 + R)u′(ci2) if ai > −B,
u′(ci1) ≥ β(1 + R)u′(ci2) otherwise.
(1)
The ﬁrst equation in (1) is the usual inter temporal condition necessary for
optimality that holds when the borrowing limit does not bind. In our anal-
ysis we exploit this optimality condition in equilibrium, which we introduce
below:
Deﬁnition 1 : A competitive equilibrium (CE) for the previous economy is
a pair (ah, al), and a return R, such that: 1) given R the conditions in (1)
5We thus think of the endowment in the ﬁrst period as deﬁning the agent’s “type”.
The normalization of π1 = 1/2 saves notation but is otherwise innocuous.
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evaluated at ci1 = e
i
1− ai and ci2 = e¯+(1+R)ai are satisﬁed for i = l, h and
such that 2), al + ah = 0.
Under our assumption on endowments and A1 existence of equilibrium is
guaranteed (see, for instance, Proposition 17.C.1 in Mas-Colell et al. 1995).
Let (R∗, a∗) stand respectively for the equilibrium price and amount of sav-
ing (hence −a∗ is the amount of borrowing) when the ﬁrst equation in (1)
holds for both types of agents (i.e., when the borrowing limit does not bind).
Since el1 < e
h
1 , A1 guarantees that a
∗ > 0, thus clt < cht , for t = 1, 2. Notice
in particular that if we take B = a∗, then by construction the borrowing
limit does not constraint the decisions on borrowing. For future reference
we deﬁne B∗ = a∗.
The equation in (1) implicitly deﬁnes the demand and supply of assets as a
function of R and the endowments. Using this equation it is straightforward
to show that
dai
dR
= β
u′(e¯ + (1 + R)ai) + (1 + R)aiu′′(e¯ + (1 + R)ai)
−u′′(ei1 − ai)− β(1 + R)2u′′(e¯ + (1 + R)ai)
. (2)
It follows from A1 that the denominator of the previous expression is always
positive. In case ai < 0 (for the given return and endowments), then we
have that a′(R) > 0, or that the supply of assets (bonds) unambiguously
decreases with R. However, the slope of the demand curve of assets (when
ai > 0) is not necessarily positive.6 To see that A1 is not enough to preclude
a backward bending demand curve as a function of R, let u(c) = (c1−σ −
1)/(1−σ), and assume eh1 +el1 = 1 = 2e¯. The unconstrained CE is such that
for all 0 < σ, R∗ = (1− β)/β and a∗ = β(eh − e¯)/(1 + β), and we have that
a′(R∗) ≥ 0⇔ σ ≤ (eh + βe¯)/(eh − e¯). We thus introduce a new assumption
that strengthens a bit A1 and prevents a negative slope in the demand of
assets:
A2: u′(e¯ + (1 + R∗)B∗) + (1 + R∗)B∗u′′(e¯ + (1 + R∗)B∗) > 0.
A2 requires that around the unconstrained CE, the positive wealth eﬀect on
the demand of assets associated to an increase in R is relatively weaker than
its substitution eﬀect (or that consumption goods in the two periods are
“gross substitutes”). It is worth clarifying that A2 does not necessarily rely
on endogenous objects: continuing with the previous example, if we take
σ < 1 then dah/dR > 0 for all R, and thus A2 is automatically satisﬁed.
The previous example imposes assumptions stronger than needed, but it is
6The slopes of demand and supply curves of bonds appear to be reversed because we
are using the return of the asset in stead of its price.
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reassuring to verify that under an appropriate choice of endowments, risk
aversion coeﬃcient and discount rate, assumption A2 holds.7
We are interested in CE such that the borrowing constraint binds for the
initially poor agents. In any of such equilibria, al = −B and thus ah = B,
hence the ﬁrst equation necessary for optimality in (1) holds for i = h. This
is useful because then equation (1) implicitly deﬁnes the equilibrium return
on bonds R as a function of B. We are ready to state the main results of
this section.
Proposition 1 : Assume A1 and A2. Then there exists  > 0 such that for
B ∈ (B∗ − , B∗), in CE al = −B, and R′(B) > 0.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The ﬁrst part of the proposition asserts that the borrowing constraint binds
when B < B∗. The second part simply states that in a CE in which the
borrowing limit binds, a larger amount of borrowing must come together
with a larger amount of saving, and that can only happen if the return on
saving is also larger. With this result at hand it is straightforward to show
that
Proposition 2: Assume A1 and A2. Then there exists  > 0 such that for
B ∈ (B∗ − , B∗), in CE v′h(B) > 0.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The previous proposition states that savers always beneﬁt from the increase
in R that comes with the increase in the borrowing limit. Our next result
is more striking:
Proposition 3 : Assume A1 and A2. Then there exists  > 0 such that for
B ∈ (B∗ − , B∗), in CE v′l(B) < 0.
Proof: See the Appendix.
To state the intuition for Proposition 3 it is useful to introduce the expression
for v′l(B), which we write as:
v′l(B) = [u
′(cl1(B))− β(1 + R)u′(cl2(B))]− u′(cl2(B))R′(B)B (3)
The intuition for Proposition 3 is as follows. The ﬁrst term in (3) measures
the net beneﬁt from having access to a larger borrowing. This beneﬁt is
7For completeness, strictly speaking A2 also guarantees that the unconstrained CE is
locally unique. The issue of uniqueness is well known to require further assumptions and
we wont discuss it further here (for more on this see for instance sections 17.D and 17.F
in Mas-Colell et al. 1995).
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positive whenever the borrowing constraint is binding, and decreases to zero
as the borrowing constraint is alleviated. We label this eﬀect the quantity
eﬀect of B. There is also a price eﬀect, due to the general equilibrium nature
of our analysis and derived from the fact that equilibrium prices must adjust
to variations in B in order to clear the assets market: by Proposition 1 a
larger B requires a larger R which means that the cost of issuing debt
increases with B. The second term of (3) measures precisely this cost in
utility terms. Hence, the general equilibrium eﬀect imposes a cost on the
borrowers side, and the important observation is that this cost is bounded
away from zero. This is so because neither savers are satiated (they always
need an extra increase in R to provide the convenient increase in the amount
of saving, or R(B)′ > 0), nor borrowers are satiated with ﬁnite consumption
(u′ > 0). The implication is that for all large enough borrowing limits
the price eﬀect dominates the quantity eﬀect, and thus in equilibrium the
welfare of the initially constrained agents ends up being smaller than it
could be.8 It follows that a policy consisting of increasing the borrowing
limit eﬀectively alleviates the borrowing constraint of initially poor agents,
but only in the beginning: after some threshold level the policy will only
improve the wellbeing of relatively rich agents, and it will do so at the
expense of the welfare of relatively poor agents.9 In other words, that policy
will presumably defeat its purpose.
There are two important messages from the previous equilibrium analysis:
First, high-type agents (or savers) beneﬁt from a larger borrowing limit that
relaxes the constraint for those agents who wish to borrow. Second, improv-
ing consumption smoothing opportunities for low-type agents (or borrowers)
by increasing their borrowing limit may have a perverse eﬀect on their wel-
fare because of the general equilibrium eﬀect on prices. In view of this, it
is natural to ask what is the eﬀect on aggregate welfare of enlarging the
borrowing limit. We provide an answer in the following section, in which we
also brieﬂy discuss the eﬀects of adding uncertainty.
B. The stochastic case
8Of course this does not mean that initially constrained agents always loose with a
larger borrowing limit. To see this, notice that the price eﬀect is absent when B = 0,
and thus, there only remains the positive beneﬁt associated to the quantity eﬀect. By
construction, this is also what happens in partial equilibrium analysis.
9This is reminiscent to Gale (1974), and Aumann and Peleg (1974) showing that in
a 2-trader, 2-commodity economy, one of the traders can gain by throwing away part of
her endowment of one of the goods and promoting a convenient change in relative prices.
A similar story applies here, with the diﬀerence that the asset market allows agents type
“high” to recover their goods in the second period.
8
We study the eﬀects of the borrowing limit under the “veil of ignorance”,
that is, we look at the eﬀect on expected welfare of a reduction in B before
agents know whether they are type high or type low. This ex ante per-
spective is appropriate because lump-sum transfers (and any other means of
compensation among agents) have been ruled-out from the analysis before
hand, and thus, the borrowing limit is the only available policy instrument
to enhance welfare. Furthermore, the ex ante welfare notion coincides with
the utilitarian notion of aggregate welfare (a weighted average of agent’s
welfare).
Suppose for a moment that we restore uncertainty but only about the en-
dowment in the second period. In this case uncertainty would emphasize
the role of saving as a means for consumption smoothing for precautionary
reasons.10 This intuition suggests that the presence of uncertainty would
reinforce the willingness to save from type-high agents, and to reduce the
borrowed amount from type-low agents, but a variation in the borrowing
limit would have the same price and quantity eﬀects as in the deterministic
case.11 We therefore restore uncertainty also in the ﬁrst period, so that
agents only know that with probability 1/2 they will be type-low, and that
with probability 1/2 they will be type-high. We then ask whether agents
would like to reduce their ability to borrow (by ﬁxing a B < B∗) before
the uncertainty about types is realized. The answer to this question is the
content of the following proposition.
Proposition 4 : Assume A1 and A2. Then there exists  > 0 such that for
B ∈ (B∗ − , B∗), in CE E[v(B)] > E[v(B∗)].
Proof: See the Appendix.
Contrary to the widespread wisdom that facilitating borrowing and lending
improves welfare because it may help to smooth out consumption over time
and states, Proposition 4 states conditions under which a too large borrowing
limit is in fact undesirable. Under these conditions, ex ante welfare would be
larger with a smaller borrowing limit.12 The result in Proposition 4 follows
10To obtain precautionary savings in static models it is usually assumed that u′′′ > 0.
Huggett and Ospina (1999) show that a convex marginal utility is irrelevant in inﬁnite
horizon economies, and that in these economies what is needed is a binding borrowing
constraint for a positive mass of agents.
11Speciﬁcally, formal proofs for propositions 1-3 for the stochastic case can be obtained
along the same lines as the ones for the deterministic case.
12Hence, Proposition 4 extends the results in Gale (1974), and Aumann and Peleg (1974)
by showing that in the ex ante sense, all agents may gain by limiting the possibilities of
trade in goods that are valuable in equilibrium.
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because for a large borrowing limit, the quantity eﬀect is small relative
to the price eﬀect due to general equilibrium considerations. That is, the
proposition follows because of the same arguments as Proposition 3, and it
implies that the borrowing limit may have also perverse eﬀects on aggregate
welfare. This is the third important result of the section.
It is perhaps puzzling the implication of Proposition 4 that when transfers
are not available, it is possible to construct a distorted competitive equilib-
rium (due to the binding borrowing constraint) in which welfare is larger
than in an equilibrium in which there is no borrowing constraint (or it is so
loose that it does not bind). One may rightly argue that in an economy with
incomplete insurance markets there is no obvious link between the presence
of a borrowing constraint and the welfare properties of the equilibrium. How-
ever, a version of Proposition 4 also holds when there is no uncertainty and
thus, the result does not hinge on the presence of uninsurable uncertainty.
To see this, consider again the deterministic economy in subsection 1.A, in
which agents are either type-h or type-l in the ﬁrst period and where they
all receive e¯ as their second period endowment. Suppose there is a benev-
olent central planner maximizing
∑2
t=1 β
t−1{αvh(ch1 , ch2) + (1− α)vl(cl1, cl2)}
by choice of ch,lt ≥ 0 for t = 1, 2, subject to feasibility: ch1 + cl1 = eh1 + el1 and
ch2 + c
l
2 = 2e¯ (α ∈ [0, 1] is the weight assigned to each type in the welfare
function). The solution to the previous problem for each α ∈ [0, 1] consti-
tutes the set of eﬃcient allocations, and it is represented with the thick line
in Figure 1.
** FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE **
Notice in particular that the utility attained by each agent under the eﬃcient
allocation when the central planner ﬁxes α = 1/2 is represented by the
point PO. In the allocation corresponding to PO all agents observe the
same consumption, irrespectively of their type, as preferences are separable
over time and they are the same for all agents. Consider now the welfare
obtained in a CE, in which the borrowing constraint is not eﬀective (B ≥
B∗). The ﬁrst fundamental welfare theorem implies that without borrowing
constraints and in the absence other distortions, the utility attained by each
(type of) agent is a point of the previous (eﬃcient) utility possibility set,
say the point labeled CE∗. This point is purposefully represented closer to
the vh axis than to the vl axis because intuitively, given the assumptions
on endowments in the CE∗ the utility of the saver cannot be smaller than
the utility of the borrower. Notice that by construction, the measure of
aggregate welfare used in Proposition 4 associated to each combination is
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proportional to the length of the arrow linking the origin with each of them.
Clearly, then, aggregate welfare associated to PO is larger than the one
associated to CE∗ (since utility is strictly increasing and strictly concave).
Suppose now that we ﬁx B slightly below B∗, so that in the new CE it is
binding. Two implications follow: First, the binding borrowing constraint
prevents welfare in the new CE to belong to the frontier of the welfare
possibility set, and in particular, welfare must be Pareto-dominated. Second,
in terms of welfare savers loose a bit (by Proposition 2), and borrowers gain
a bit, since near B∗ the quantity eﬀect is necessarily smaller than the price
eﬀect (by Proposition 3). In particular, if B is close enough to B∗ (in
the sense of the propositions), then the quantity eﬀect will be negligible
compared to the price eﬀect, and since marginal utility is decreasing, the
welfare gains will necessarily outweigh the welfare looses (such a combination
is labeled CEB in the ﬁgure). Hence, introducing a borrowing limit is a way
to redistribute utility from lenders to borrowers and yet aggregate welfare in
the CE increases. This fact, however, does not mean that in a competitive
equilibrium it is possible to achieve the welfare associated to PO only with
a convenient choice of the borrowing limit: a too small borrowing limit will
deliver welfare looses for all agents, which means that aggregate welfare as
a function of the borrowing limit displays an inverted U-shape (we return
to this issue in Section 3.3).
3 Inﬁnite horizon
An important limitation of the previous analysis is that with only two peri-
ods, it should be possible to choose an initial distribution of types such that
ex ante welfare increases in face of a given variation in B. Furthermore,
by construction all distributions have two mass points. To overcome these
limitations, we use numerical methods to look at multi period versions of
the previous environment in which the equilibrium is characterized by prices
and quantities as usual, and a unique, endogenously determined, equilibrium
distribution of types.
We follow Aiyagari (1994), Huggett (1997), and Krusell and Smith (1998)
among others, and we study a production economy which admits as a par-
ticular case an exchange economy similar to the one in the preceding section.
First we describe in detail the production version of the economy, and later
we indicate the modiﬁcations needed to encompass the exchange version.
Speciﬁcally, we assume there is a continuum of agents maximizing utility
11
over an inﬁnite horizon. In every period, agents are subject to idiosyncratic
shocks of labor productivity, which can take values si, i = h,m, l (for high,
medium, and low productivity). These shocks follow a Markov chain with
probabilities of transition given by the matrix Π = [πi|j ], where πi|j ∈ [0, 1]
is the probability of receiving endowment si in the following period provided
that the agent received sj in the current period. Preferences over consump-
tion are given by a CRRA index, such that the objective of the agents is to
maximize E0
∑
t β
t(c1−σt −1)/(1−σ), β ∈ (0, 1), 0 < σ = 1, and where E0 is
the conditional expectations operator (the case of σ = 1 corresponds to log
preferences). We also assume a neoclassical technology for the production of
the consumption/investment good, which uses capital and labor in eﬃciency
units F (Kt, Lt) = AKθt L
1−θ
t (A is a scale parameter measuring total factor
productivity). Capital depreciates at a constant rate δ ∈ (0, 1), and it is the
only available asset. Finally, we assume that all markets are competitive,
and that insurance markets for bad realizations of the endowment of labor
productivity (and other contingent contracts) are exogenously precluded.13
Using standard recursive methods, a stationary competitive equilibrium
(SRCE) for this environment can be described by means of the following
objects. Let x = (a, s) be the amount of assets in the hands of an agent in
period t and her current endowment of labor productivity. Hence x is the in-
dividual state in period t, which lies in the space X = [−B, Bˆ]×{sh, sm, sl},
where as before −B is the borrowing limit and where Bˆ is a large upper
bound on asset holdings that in equilibrium will no be binding in any pe-
riod. The aggregate state in period t is denoted ψ, a probability measure
deﬁned over a convenient sigma algebra X of X describing the distribution
of agents over idiosyncratic states. Associated to this probability measure
there is a transition function H such that ψ′(C) = H(ψ,C) for all C ∈ X .
The interpretation is that H(ψ,C) measures, given the current distribution,
the mass of agents that will lie in a set C in the following period. Finally,
it is useful to introduce K(ψ) and L(ψ) to denote the aggregate amount of
capital and labor as functions of the aggregate state.
Deﬁnition 2: A Recursive Competitive Equilibrium (RCE) consists of lists
of functions {v(x, ψ), c(x, ψ), a(x, ψ)}, {r(ψ), w(ψ)}, and {ψ,H} such that:
13This setting is a general equilibrium version of the “income ﬂuctuations problem”
studied earlier by Schechtman and Escudero (1977). See also Clarida (1987), and Cham-
berlain and Wilson (2000).
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1) {v(x, ψ), c(x, ψ), a(x, ψ)} solve the consumers problem:
v(x, ψ) = maxc,a{u(c) + β∑s′ πs′|sv(x′, ψ′)}
s.t. c + a′ = w(ψ)s′ + (1 + r(ψ)− δ)a,
c ≥ 0, a′ ≥ −B,
ψ′ = H(ψ);
2) Markets clear: K(ψ) =
∫
X a(x, ψ)dψ and L(ψ) =
∫
X s(x, ψ)dψ;
3) {r(ψ), w(ψ)} are competitive, hence they satisfy:
r(ψ) = F1(K(ψ), L(ψ)), and w(ψ) = F2(K(ψ), L(ψ));
4) Law of motion: H is generated by a(x, ψ), that is, the appropriate aggre-
gation of agents optimal decisions given the states, so that ψ′(C) = H(ψ,C)
for all C ∈ X .
Part 1 in the previous deﬁnition states that v(x, ψ) is the value function asso-
ciated to the solution of the utility maximization problem of the consumers,
and that c = c(x, ψ), a′ = a(x, ψ) are the optimal policies for consumption
and next period asset holdings; Part 2 is the usual market clearing condi-
tion, and part 3 implies that ﬁrms maximize proﬁts. Part 4 of the previous
deﬁnition requires that the aggregate state is consistent with decision rules
at the individual level. Notice that feasibility is satisﬁed by Walras law.
The above production economy specializes to a pure exchange economy by
ﬁxing both θ and the initial endowment of capital equal to zero. In this
economy agents receive idiosyncratic endowments equal to Asi, and capital
plays no role in production. In this case we assume that to smooth out
consumption agents trade a safe bond. The deﬁnition of the RCE when the
exchange economy is considered is analogous to Deﬁnition 2, with market
clearing requiring
∫
X a(x, ψ)dψ = 0,
∫
X c(x, ψ)dψ =
∫
X Asdψ at the equilib-
rium asset return R(ψ). In both the production and exchange economies it
is straightforward to provide a convenient deﬁnition for the time-invariant
equilibrium:
Deﬁnition 3: A Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium (SRCE) is a
RCE characterized by a ψ∗ such that ψ∗(C) = H(ψ∗, C) for all C ∈ X .
In our quantitative exercise we will address the eﬀects of the borrowing limit
by comparing steady states and also by taking into account the transition
from one to another. Our benchmark calibration follows Davila et al. (2005)
and it is summarized by the parameter values in Table 1.
** TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE **
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A few comments about the calibration are in order before we continue. The
value of A is chosen so that output in the frictionless, complete markets
version of the economy, equals one. Davila et al. (2005) report that the
earnings process delivers a Gini index of 0.60, close to the 0.61 observed
in the U.S., and that the corresponding Gini index of wealth (assuming
σ = 2 and B = 0) equals 0.853, again very close to the actual ﬁgure of the
U.S. economy. Thus, large diﬀerences in the states of the earning process
and high persistence is needed to match relevant statistics of the income and
wealth distribution of the U.S. economy. Finally, the choice of β reﬂects that
periods are measured in years, which together with the other parameters of
the model produce a capital-output ratio about 3 and an equilibrium real
interest rate close to the rough 4% average observed in the U.S. 14
In what follows we will be mainly concerned about the eﬀect of an increase of
the borrowing limit from B to B′ on welfare. To this end, we use the function
λ(x,B,B′) to measure the consumption equivalent units that would leave an
agent in state x in the initial steady state, to be indiﬀerent between staying
there and jumping to the new steady state. This function is implicitly
deﬁned by
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(c(xt; p¯(B))λ(x,B,B′))|x0
]
= E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(c(xt; p¯(B′)))|x0
]
,
where p¯(B) = [r¯(B), w¯(B)] and p¯(B′) = [r¯(B′), w¯(B′)] stand for the constant
prices at each steady state. As usual, a value of λ larger (smaller) than one
indicates that the consumption of the agent in state x in the initial steady
state should increase (decrease) in order to leave her indiﬀerent between
steady states. The function μ(x,B,B′), which is deﬁned in an analogous
way, goes beyond the steady states comparison and it takes into account the
transition between them.
3.1 Exchange economy
Table 2 reports the equilibrium interest rate corresponding to several steady
states diﬀering only in the borrowing limit B. The table reveals that for a
given borrowing limit, the interest rate decreases as the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion increases. That is, more risk averse societies need a smaller
14We checked that our solution algorithm replicates the results reported in Davila et al.
(2005) (see Table 3 below). We refer the reader to that paper for further details about
the calibration.
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and smaller return to saving in order to clear the asset market. This ﬁnding
is consistent with the results about the risk free rate in Huggett (1993).
Table 2 also reveals that for a given value of σ, the stationary interest rate
increases with the borrowing limit. This second ﬁnding is consistent with
Proposition 1 in the preceding section.
**TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE**
We now ﬁx σ = 2 and in Figure 2 we report the results about a steady state
comparison when we increase the borrowing limit from the benchmark case
of B = 1 to B′ = 2.15 In the horizontal axes we measure the support of
the distribution of assets in the initial steady state, thus the λ’s reported
in the ﬁgure correspond to the consumption equivalent units associated to
each asset and productivity level. This steady state comparison reveals that
all agents are better oﬀ in a steady state with a larger borrowing limit, as
λ is always above one. Hence in this example the previous Proposition 2
holds but Proposition 3 does not. It is also clear that “savers” (i.e., agents
holding non negative assets, irrespectively of their labor productivity) gain
more the larger is their amount of assets. This result is due to the fact
that the return to saving increases with a larger borrowing limit (i.e., due
to the price eﬀect). Interestingly, the gains of low productivity agents are
not monotone in their asset level. For instance, low productivity agents
that are initially borrowing constrained (or close to be so) gain more than
agents that initially hold zero assets. The explanation for this is that the
beneﬁts for the agents in the lower tail of the distribution of assets come from
the better consumption smoothing possibilities due to the larger borrowing
limit (i.e., because of the quantity eﬀect). Nevertheless, as soon as we look at
larger asset levels the positive quantity eﬀect becomes less and less important
relative to the price eﬀect, which is negative for borrowers. Clearly, then, a
larger borrowing limit has a very diﬀerent eﬀect depending on whether the
agent is liquidity constrained or not. To see this from a diﬀerent perspective,
notice that the beneﬁts of medium productivity agents holding the smallest
level of assets are also smaller than those of the low productivity agents.
The reason is that for these agents the borrowing constraint is less stringent
than for low productivity agents, and thus, the quantity eﬀect is smaller.
We try to reduce the quantity eﬀect relative to the price eﬀect by increasing
the borrowing limit from a larger initial level. When we look at the steady
state comparison moving from B = 2.5 to B′ = 3 we ﬁnd that the general
shape of λ is similar to the one in the previous example. However, we ﬁnd
15That is, our benchmark case allows to borrow the yearly per capita income corre-
sponding to the complete-markets representative-agent economy with production.
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that the price eﬀect dominates the quantity eﬀect for indebted, medium-
productivity agents, which loose about 0,5% of their consumption, and for
slightly indebted low-productivity agents, who loose about 0.01%.16 Hence,
welfare decreases for some agents, although borrowing constrained agents
still gain with the larger B.
** FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE **
For completeness we brieﬂy report the results for welfare once the transition
between steady states is properly taken into account (i.e., the μ function
we introduced before). Figure 3 reports the results over a transition from
B = 2.5 to B′ = 3. A ﬁrst thing to notice is that the beneﬁts for the high
productivity agents are larger than when the transition is ignored, and that
at the same time, the beneﬁts to medium and low productivity agents are
substantially smaller, or even negative (as in the steady state comparisons,
in examples starting from a larger initial B we ﬁnd that these eﬀects are
larger). In particular, borrowing constrained agents in the initial steady
state loose welfare once the transition is taken into account. These ﬁndings
suggest that there are large price eﬀects associated to the transition toward
a new steady state with a larger borrowing limit, and the results about
welfare are consistent with the messages discussed after propositions 2 and
3 developed in Section 2.
** FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE **
We conclude this subsection by looking at the mass of winners and losers,
which is given by the equilibrium distribution in the initial steady state. For
an example with B = 2.5 we ﬁnd that the steady state (initial) distribution
is such that more than 90% of the population is concentrated at the lower tail
of the distribution (in the case of B = 1 we obtain a similar ﬁgure). This is
a consequence of the high persistence of the the Markov process governing
labor productivity endowments and the fact that we are dealing with an
endowment economy. Since in the welfare comparisons taking into account
the transition we generally ﬁnd that poor, low and medium-productivity
agents loose, this distribution implies that there will be a large mass of
agents whom will actually beneﬁt very little, or even loose welfare, when the
borrowing limit is increased. In short, this conﬁrms that larger borrowing
limits may have perverse eﬀects on agent’s welfare. We consider next the
economy with production and we asses the robustness of the previous results.
16We have obtained results along these lines in other steady state comparisons not
reported for reasons of space. For instance, a similar price eﬀect, but weaker than in the
B = 2.5 to B′ = 3 comparison, is obtained in the comparison from B = 2 to B′ = 2.5.
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3.2 Production economy
We begin by reporting a few basic facts at the steady state (aggregate assets,
output, saving rate -deﬁned as investment over output-, and the equilibrium
interest rate R = r − δ) of the heterogeneous-agents incomplete-markets
economy described above (labeled HA). Table 3 reports the results for several
values of σ and borrowing limits, ranging from no borrowing at all and up
to a large fraction of per capita income at equilibrium prices. The table also
includes a characterization of the representative agent (RA) counterpart
that would be obtained if markets where complete.17
**TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE**
For a given borrowing limit, reading the table from left to right we see
that aggregate assets increase, and so does output and the saving rate, as
risk aversion increases. We also see that the net interest rate R decreases
along this dimension. For a given risk aversion coeﬃcient, moving from
top to bottom we get a picture of the eﬀect at the steady state of a larger
borrowing limit. Our results suggest that assets decrease and the interest
rate increases when the borrowing limit is less stringent. These ﬁndings
are consistent with the results in the precautionary savings literature and
with the intuition developed in Section 2.18 Notice that since labor supply
is exogenously given, the reduction in aggregate capital (assets) also means
that both production and wages shrink. We also see that the saving rate
remains almost unchanged, with a slight tendency to decrease. Finally, for
the case of B = 0 we report the Gini coeﬃcient of wealth distribution, which
is consistent the one reported in Davila et al. (2005).
We are now ready to study the welfare eﬀects associated to larger borrow-
ing limits. To facilitate the comparison with the results for the exchange
economies we begin by brieﬂy looking at steady states, and latter we prop-
erly take into account the eﬀect of the transition.19 Starting with a steady
states comparison, Figure 4 reports the ﬁndings for the benchmark case
with σ = 2 from B = 1 to B′ = 2. We ﬁnd that the general shape of the
function λ is similar to the one corresponding to the exchange economy: es-
sentially, that the gains are non monotone for low levels of assets, and that
17As a reference, the economy in Davila et al. (2005) corresponds to the case of no
borrowing (B = 0.0) and σ = 2.
18A´braha´m and Ca´rceles-Poveda (2007) obtain similar results.
19Abstracting from transitional dynamics is specially misleading for production
economies because it ignores the cost (beneﬁt) of building up (depleting) the stock of
capital.
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they are larger the larger are the initial asset holdings. Nevertheless, there
are two outstanding diﬀerences. First, the gains are substantially smaller:
in the production economy the gains in consumption in the best of the cases
(for rich agents) are well below 6%, whereas in the exchange economy a
larger borrowing limit could easily represent about a 20% steady increase
in consumption. Second, with the exception of liquidity constrained agents
in the initial steady state (very poor, low-productivity agents), poor agents
(mainly holding debt) observe looses in their stationary consumption pro-
cess when the borrowing limit increases. In fact, this loss in consumption
is observed even in agents holding positive amounts of assets (with a larger
initial borrowing limit, such as B = 2 or B = 2.5, these facts are magniﬁed).
These ﬁndings suggest that the price eﬀect is larger, and the quantity eﬀect
smaller, in production economies than in exchange economies. The explana-
tion for this is that in the class of production economies we are considering,
an increase in the borrowing limit promotes a reduction in capital such that
the interest rate increases and such that the wage rate decreases (these eﬀects
are also present in Li and Sarte 2006). Thus, unlike in exchange economies
where labor income is independent of the borrowing limit, in production
economies the reduction in labor income harms all agents, more so the ones
for whom labor income represents a larger fraction of their total income.
Hence, the overall eﬀect on an agent’s welfare depends on the relative size
of capital and labor income in her total income.
** FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE **
** FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE **
We now evaluate the dynamic eﬀects of price changes that occur over a
transition from one steady state to another with a larger borrowing limit.
We ﬁnd that over such a transition the stock of capital monotonically de-
creases toward the new steady state level. The implication of this is that
during the transition the interest rate monotonically increases, and the wage
rate monotonically decreases, and thus, limiting the analysis to steady state
comparisons tends to overestimate the negative price eﬀect. Figure 5 re-
ports the results corresponding to the transition from B = 1 to B′ = 2 with
σ = 2. The comparison of Figures 4 and 5 conﬁrm the intuition that the
gains in consumption due to a larger borrowing limit are underestimated
when the transition is ignored: in particular, those who gain (like rich and
high-productivity agents in the initial steady state) gain more, and those
who loose (like poor medium-productivity agents in the initial steady state)
loose less, than what we would say by just looking at the steady state com-
parison. We have computed other examples, including cases in which all
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agents observe net gains from enlarging the borrowing limit. For instance,
this is the case if the borrowing limit is increased from 0 to 0.5 with σ = 2.
In this case, the gains for the poorest agents with sl can be as large as 10%
of their current consumption. Agents with sh and sm observe more modest
gains, between 0.4% and 0.8% at low levels of wealth, but up to 2,5% of
consumption at high wealth levels. Nevertheless, even if in this case there
are gains for all agents irrespectively of their wealth level and productivity
state, the beneﬁts for the middle class (in terms of assets) and not so pro-
ductive agents (sm) are smaller than those accruing to the poorer and to
the suﬃciently rich. We have explored several transitions under σ = 1 and
σ = 3, and we have obtained similar results.
For completeness we also assess informally whether winners are more or less
abundant than losers when the borrowing limit is increased. In Figure 6 we
plot the equilibrium distribution of agents over asset levels corresponding to
the steady state with B = 1. Combining the information in this ﬁgure with
that in Figure 5 which takes into account the transition, a rough assessment
suggests that about one third of the population would observe losses in their
consumption after enlarging the borrowing limit.
** FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE **
Our computations suggest that in general there will be winers and losers
from extending the possibilities of borrowing. The winners are primarily
those agents that are initially rich enough to be able to save (i.e., for whom
borrowing is irrelevant), and their beneﬁt consist essentially of a larger re-
turn to their saving. There is a second kind of winners: those agents that
would like to borrow more for consumption smoothing purposes (or that in
the initial steady state will like to do so rather soon). In our calibration these
agents are the very poor and they are endowed with the lowest labor produc-
tivity. Finally, the losers are those agents that in the initial steady state are
not particularly interested in borrowing more (i.e., they are not borrowing
constrained), but that hold negative assets (in the exchange economies), or
even slightly positive assets (in the production economies). These agents are
the poor, or low middle-class, and they represent a large fraction of the pop-
ulation. Roughly speaking, then, our results suggest that the middle class
may observe substantial welfare loses from increasing borrowing limits.
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3.3 Aggregate welfare
We conclude by computing aggregate welfare at the steady state correspond-
ing to several B, and over the transition to various B′ from a ﬁxed B. In
the ﬁrst exercises we aggregate welfare by means of the utilitarian function
with weights given by the stationary ψ corresponding to each steady state:
W (B) =
∫
v(c(x,B))dψ (notice that we introduce B as an explicit argu-
ment). Table 4 reports this measure of aggregate welfare for the case of
σ = 2 for the exchange and the production economy.
**TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE**
**TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE**
It is clear that in the exchange economy aggregate welfare increases as we
allow some borrowing, but after some critical level between 1 and 2 units,
aggregate welfare starts to decrease again (per capita income in this econ-
omy is 1.5219). Clearly, then, the inverted U-shape holds in this aggregate
comparison of steady states for the exchange economy. Aggregate welfare in
the production economy behaves in quite a diﬀerent way: it monotonically
decreases as we increase the borrowing limit. Why are there these striking
diﬀerences between the two economies? The reason is that in the exchange
economy aggregate consumption is constant and independent of B, but in
the production economy both capital and output are smaller the larger is
the borrowing. As we discussed before, the reduction in capital is specially
bad for agents who’s labor income is the main source of income. In the
examples of Table 4, the wage rate in the exchange economy is simply A,
thus w = 0.273. In the production economy the wage rate with B = 0 is
w = 0.155, and it decreases up to a 6%, for B = 2.5 we have w = 0.146.
Thus, equilibrium distributions under larger B in the production economy
put more mass of agents at lower levels of wealth (like in the exchange econ-
omy), and these agents are poorer than in the exchange economy because
they obtain less and less income from their labor. In Table 5 we report ag-
gregate welfare at the steady state when we impose a positive lower bound
on capital holdings. The table also reports the aggregate amount of capital.
It is clear that welfare increases as we increase the minimum assets, until we
reach a point between 3 and 3.5 units, which produces an average amount
of capital of about 6.5 units (a positive limit of 3 units is about 200% of
per capita income). After this level, welfare starts to decrease again. It is
interesting to remember that for the same economy with B = 0, Davila et
al. (2005) ﬁnd that the optimal (constrained eﬃcient) amount of capital is
14.742. Like in the two periods case at the end of section 2, it seems that
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a conveniently chosen borrowing limit may take the equilibrium allocation
closer to the optimal allocation, and yet, there is ample room for policy
interventions which presumably could increase welfare substantially.
The results in Tables 4 and 5 point to the optimal lower bound for asset
holdings in a static sense: If the economy had to choose where to ﬁx the
lower bound, what would be the best choice in the sense of ex ante/aggregate
welfare? The answer for the exchange economy is consistent with Proposi-
tion 4, but the proposition does not hold for the production economy. A
more interesting question is, given a current bound B, what are the welfare
gains/losses associated to changing to a B′ once the transition is taken into
account? Figure 7 provides a partial answer to this question.
** FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE **
In Figure 7 we take as a benchmark the aggregate welfare corresponding to
the steady state with B = 0, and we plot how aggregate welfare changes
with B′ when the transition to the steady state with the new B′ is taken
into account (aggregate welfare is measured as the integral of the value
function that takes into account the transition to each of the new steady
states, integrated against the stationary measure corresponding to B = 0).
The benchmark B = 0 is useful because it allows us to asses the gains from
borrowing in a natural way (we come back to this issue below). It is clear
that utilitarian welfare increases as some borrowing is allowed. However,
the gains in welfare decrease as B′ increases: aggregate welfare peaks in
the transition from B = 0 to B′ = 2, and then it decreases thereafter (we
checked in particular that the welfare associated to the transition to B′ = 2.6
is -26.626, smaller than the one over the transition to B′ = 2.5 which is -
26.62, which in turn is smaller than the one corresponding to B′ = 2). In
this dynamic sense, therefore, Proposition 4 also holds for the production
economy.
The choice of the benchmark B = 0 and restricting the analysis to increases
of the borrowing limit is not arbitrary: These choices assure that for all
agents in the initial distribution there is a possible choice in the consumption
set once the new B′ is set in place. In light of our previous ﬁndings, and
those in Davila et al. (2005), it would be very interesting to study transitions
motivated by a decrease in the borrowing limit, i.e., when agents are forced
to reduce the amount of debt or even to end up every period with a positive
amount of assets. In these cases there is a positive mass of agents in the ﬁrst
period that have an amount of assets that does not belong to the relevant
state space under the new B, precisely because the borrowing limit would be
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smaller than before, and for those agent the choice set may easily be empty.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we show that while some borrowing and lending is desirable
from a welfare perspective, equilibrium prices associated to large borrowing
limits tend to harm borrowers and to beneﬁt lenders. In particular, the
eﬀect of prices on welfare may be so large that, after a certain threshold
level is reached, aggregate welfare may decrease as borrowing increases. We
show these results in a variety of environments, from a two period, determin-
istic economy, to an inﬁnite horizon model with production, idiosyncratic
uncertainty, and incomplete insurance markets. When we compare aggre-
gate welfare across steady states, we ﬁnd that aggregate welfare for exchange
economies displays an inverted U-shape as a function of the borrowing limit.
This property does not hold for the production economy we examine (a cal-
ibrated version of the U.S. economy), for which we ﬁnd that the highest
aggregate welfare at the steady state is obtained under a large and positive
lower bound for asset holdings. Once the transition from the steady state
with no borrowing to some other one with borrowing is considered, we ﬁnd
that aggregate welfare in the production economy also displays an inverted
U-shape: transiting to a new steady state with a too large borrowing limit
is worse that moving to a steady state with a more stringent limit. Since
our results follow from a general equilibrium eﬀect on prices, we think that
they should be relevant not only for the credit market at the household
level studied in this paper, but also in other environments in which policy
variables may directly aﬀect equilibrium prices.
There is an interesting extension to this paper that is worth to consider.
In Section 5.3 we ﬁnd that aggregate welfare at the steady state for the
incomplete markets economy with production is largest when at the indi-
vidual level there is a positive lower bound for asset holdings. However,
the amount of capital under the optimal lower bound for assets is still too
small compared to the corresponding constrained-eﬃcient level (Davila et
al. 1995). Given this, it is natural to ask what are the policies that are able
to implement as an equilibrium outcome the constrained-eﬃcient amount of
capital, which of course is Pareto superior. Beyond this, if one is to adopt
a dynamic perspective, then the relevant question is What are the policies
that are able to implement the constrained-eﬃcient allocation from the cur-
rent initial condition? A ﬁrst issue in dealing with this question is that we
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do not know how initial conditions aﬀect constrained-eﬃcient allocations (in
the context of production economies with incomplete insurance markets). A
second diﬃculty has to do with the fact that the relevant policies need to
assure that for all agents represented in the initial condition, the transition
to the new steady state is feasible. Simple policies like a uniform lower
bound on assets are very likely to fail this feasibility requirement. A deeper
investigation of these issues is left for future work.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: By continuity of the ﬁrst equation in (1) at (ah =
B∗, R∗) we can and ﬁnd a δ0 > 0 such that if |R−R∗| < δ0, then ah′(R) > 0
(provided that ah′(R∗) > 0 by A2). Given this δ0 we can also ﬁnd a δ1 > 0
such that if |ah − B∗| < δ1, then |R(ah) − R∗| < δ0. Hence we can choose
 ∈ (0,min{δ1, B∗}] such that ah′(R) > 0 whenever ah > B∗ − . The
equation in (1) then implies that R(ah) < R(B∗) for ah ∈ (B∗−, B∗). Take
B = B∗−, and assume, toward a contradiction, that in CE al > −B. Then
ah > B = B∗−, and thus, R(B) < R(B∗) provided that the equation in (1)
holds for type-h agents. However, if al > −B then el−al < el+B < el+B∗,
hence u′(el − al) > u′(el + B∗). The hypothesis implies that (1) holds
with equality also for type-l agents, and thus, β(1 + R)u′(e¯ − (1 + R)al) >
β(1 + R∗)u′(e¯ − (1 + R∗)B∗), which can only happen if R > R∗. This
contradicts the fact that R(B) < R(B∗), and thus al = −B. For the second
statement, since equilibrium requires ah = B, then FONC corresponding to
agents type-h reads −u′(eh1 − B) + β(1 + R)u′(e¯ + (1 + R)B) = 0. Totally
diﬀerentiating the expression and rearranging produces
dR
dB
=
−u′′(eh1 −B)− β(1 + R)2u′′(e¯ + (1 + R)B)
β(u′(e¯ + (1 + R)B) + (1 + R)Bu′′(e¯ + (1 + R)B))
, (4)
which can only be positive because of A1 and A2
Proof of Proposition 2: Choose an  as explained in the proof of Proposition
1, and take B = B∗ − . Proposition 1 then implies that ah = B. Thus we
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have that vh(B) = u(eh1 −B) + βu(e¯ + (1 + R(B))B). It follows that
v′h(B) = −u′(eh1 −B) + βu′(e¯ + (1 + R(B))B)[1 + R(B) + R′(B)B].
Since the FONC in this case reads −u′(eh1 − B) + β(1 + R(B))u′(e¯ + (1 +
R(B))B) = 0, it follows that v′h(B) = u
′(e¯+(1+R(B))B)R′(B)B, which is
strictly positive by A1 and Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 3: Choose an  as explained in the proof of Proposition
1, and take B = B∗ − . Proposition 1 then implies that ah = B. We have
that vl(B) = u(el1 +B)+βu(e¯− (1+R(B))B). Diﬀerentiating with respect
to B and rearranging we obtain
v′l(B)
B =
V1(B)
B − V2(B),
where V1(B) = u′(el1 + B) − β(1 + R(B))u′(e¯ − (1 + R(B))B) and where
V2(B) = βu′(e¯ − (1 + R(B))B)R′(B). We will prove the result by showing
that V1(B) is positive but monotonically declining to zero as B approaches
B∗ (i.e., as  approaches zero), and by showing that V2(B) is also positive but
bounded away from zero. Hence, by continuity it will follow that v′l(B) < 0
for all B suﬃciently close to B∗ (i.e.,  suﬃciently close to 0). V1(B) is the
FOC of the borrower, hence it is positive for B < B∗ by Proposition 1, and it
is zero by construction for B = B∗. A1 and Proposition 1 assure that V1(B)
is monotonically declining in B. Hence V1(B)/B can be made arbitrarily
close to zero as → 0. V2(B) is positive by A1 and by Proposition 1. Notice
also from (4) that
R′(B) >
−u′′(eh1 −B)− β(1 + R)2u′′(e¯ + (1 + R)B)
βu′(e¯ + (1 + R)B)
,
hence V2(B) > −u′′(eh1 − B) − β(1 + R)2u′′(e¯ + (1 + R)B), and by A1,
V2(B) > −u′′(eh1 − B). Since u is strictly concave, then for all B ∈ [0, B∗]
(i.e., for all ﬁnite consumption) we have that −u′′(eh1 − B) ≥ M for some
M > 0. Hence, the result holds for all  ≤ 0, where 0 satisﬁes that
V1(B∗ − 0) ≤ −M , and the proof is completed
Proof of Proposition 4: Choose  ∈ (0,min{δ1, B∗}] as explained in the proof
of Proposition 1, and let B = B∗ − . We write E[v(B)] = 1/2(vh(B) +
vl(B)), where vs(B) = u(cs1) + βE[u(c
s′
2 )|s], for s, s′ = h, l. We will show
that v′h(B) + v
′
l(B) < 0 for B close to B
∗ (i.e., for  close to zero) by
applying similar arguments to those in Proposition 3. To this end, compute
the derivative of E[v(B)], cancel out terms using the FOC of the type-h
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consumers, and reorganize terms to get 2E[v′(B)] = W1(B) +W2(B),where
W1(B) = βR′(B)B
(
E[u′(cs
′
2 |h]− E[u′(cs
′
2 )|l]
)
,
where
W2(B) = u′(cll)− β(1 + R(B))E[u′(cs
′
2 )|l],
and were
dR
dB
=
−u′′(ch1)− β(1 + R)2E[u′′(cs
′
2 )|h]
β(E[u′(cs′2 )|h] + (1 + R)BE[u′′(cs′2 )|h]
, (5)
holds in this version of the economy with uncertainty. Consumption in the
second period depends on both, the state in the ﬁrst and in the second
period, which we denote as ch2 |h = eh2 + (1 + R)B, cl2|h = el2 + (1 + R)B,
and ch2 |l = eh2 − (1 + R)B, cl2|l = el2 − (1 + R)B. By A1 and an appropriate
version of Proposition 1, we have that E[u′(cs′2 )|h] − E[u′(cs
′
2 )|l] < 0 for all
B ∈ (B∗ − , B∗). Furthermore, E[u′(cs′2 )|h]−E[u′(cs
′
2 )|l] decreases with B,
hence there is some N1 < 0 such that E[u′(cs
′
2 )|h]−E[u′(cs
′
2 )|l] ≤ N1 for all .
Since for all B ∈ (B∗− , B∗) consumption in the second period is ﬁnite and
bounded away from zero, it also follows that there is some N2 > 0 such that
for all , dR/dB > N2. We conclude that W1(B) < BN1N2. Next, W2(B)
is positive and can be made arbitrarily close to zero as B approaches B∗ by
the same arguments as in Proposition 3. Since B = B∗ − , then there is ′
such that W2(B∗− ′) = −(B∗− ′)N1N2. It follows that 2E[v′(B∗− )] < 0
for all  ∈ (0,min{δ1, B∗, ′}], and the proof is concluded
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Table 1: Parameter values.
General β θ A δ
Parameters 0.887 0.36 0.273 0.08
Earnings s ∈ {sh, sm, sl} {46.55 5.29 1}
πs|s′ =
⎡
⎣ 0.917 0.083 0.00.011 0.980 0.009
0.0 0.008 0.992
⎤
⎦
Table 2: Steady states, exchange economy.
R σ = 1 σ = 2 σ = 3
B = 0 -.31563 -.84648 -.98038
B = 1 .006 -.15793 -.29451
B = 2 .04284 -.06332 -.1446
B = 3 .05892 -.02488 -.08847
Equilibrium interest rates under several
borrowing limits and risk aversions.
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Table 3: Steady states, production economy.
RA HA
σ = 1 σ = 2 σ = 3
B = 0.0
K 1.7358 2.4782 4.0264 6.7238
Y 1.0 1.1360 1.3537 1.6282
sr 0.1388 0.1744 0.2379 0.3303
Gini W 0.8797 0.8567 0.8217
R 0.1273 0.0813 0.041 0.0071
B = 0.5
K 2.3828 3.8165 6.3432
Y 1.1208 1.3279 1.5944
sr 0.1700 0.2299 0.3182
R 0.0893 0.0452 0.0104
B = 1.0
K 2.3377 3.6749 6.0489
Y 1.1131 1.3099 1.5674
sr 0.1680 0.2244 0.3087
R 0.0914 0.0483 0.0132
B = 2.0
K 3.4624 5.6806
Y 1.2822 1.5323
sr 0.2160 0.2965
R 0.0533 0.0188
B = 2.5
K 3.4032 5.3261
Y 1.2742 1.4972
sr 0.2136 0.2845
R 0.0547 0.0211
B = 3.0
K 5.1560
Y 1.4798
sr 0.2787
R 0.0233
Gini W stands for the Gini Coeﬃcient in wealth distri-
bution.
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Table 4: Aggregate welfare W (σ = 2).
B = 0 B = 0.5 B = 1 B = 2 B = 2.5
Exchange -18.9 -12.8 -12.5 -13.3 -14.0
Production -30.0 -33.3 -41.4 -85.7 -272.0
Aggregate welfare at the steady state under several borrowing
limit for the exchange and production economy.
Table 5: Aggregate welfare, W , and K (σ = 2).
B = −0.5 B = −1 B = −1.5 B = −2 B = −2.5 B = −3
W -27.2686 -25.2169 -24.0221 -23.2232 -22.7382 -22.8123
K 4.2388 4.5324 4.8233 5.1768 6.0296 6.8123
Aggregate welfare and capital stock at the steady state under several “sav-
ing” limits for the production economy.
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Figure 1: Aggregate welfare in a CE with a binding borrowing constraint (RCE)
can be larger than with no constraint (CE), but it is smaller than in PO.
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Figure 6: Equilibrium distribution of agents over assets in the steady state with
B = 1 in the production economy.
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Figure 7: Aggregate welfare taking into account the transition to a larger bor-
rowing limit displays an inverted-U shape: Aggregate welfare over the transition
to B′ = 2 is larger than over any other transition.
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